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Security review of widely used software · net-snmp (npm)

net-snmp (npm): a blank user name bypassed authorization in Node.js SNMP agents and receivers

Status · FixedReported · 17 Nov 2026Fixed and released · 18 Nov 2026 (3.29.3)Advisory · GHSA-pg9p-672x-44jc, Critical (CVSS 9.1)Dates in UTC

In net-snmp, the SNMP package for Node.js, an unauthenticated request with an empty user name, one UDP packet each, could read every value served by an SNMP agent built on it with the default access-control setting, change any writable one, and inject alerts into an SNMP receiver. It was reported privately with a suggested fix, fixed by the maintainer in version 3.29.3 within a day, and published as a Critical advisory that credits this researcher (GitHub: otoinobuo) as the reporter.

This is the Node.js package net-snmp (GitHub: markabrahams/node-net-snmp; roughly 90,000–100,000 npm downloads a week, mostly as a client, which was not affected). It is not the Net-SNMP C tools (net-snmp.org, snmpd), which are unaffected.

In plain terms

SNMP is how network equipment and servers are monitored and configured: a monitoring system asks a device for readings and can change its settings. Earlier SNMP versions control access with a shared "community" string; version 3 adds individual user names, with optional passwords and encryption, so that only configured users can do that.

  1. Leaving the user name blank got you in. net-snmp correctly turned away unknown user names, and a real user's requests sent without the password, but a request with no user name at all was treated as an allowed user. With the library's default settings, that could read every value the device publishes and overwrite the ones that can be changed.
  2. Fake alerts could be injected. A program that receives SNMP alerts (traps) and is meant to accept them only from known users accepted alerts from the blank name as genuine.

Who was exposed: Node.js applications that run their own SNMP agent, alert receiver or proxy with default settings, reachable by untrusted hosts. Not exposed: applications that only use net-snmp as a client, and the Net-SNMP C tools. Reporting privately let the maintainer fix it before the details were public; affected applications should update to 3.29.3.

What this researcher did

Found the flaw, demonstrated it on a local test setup, reported it privately with a working fix, and, at the maintainer's request, tested his fix branch before release. The published advisory credits him as the reporter.

The problem

RFC 3414, which defines SNMPv3 user security, says a zero-length user name "will not match any user, but it can be used for snmpEngineID discovery." In net-snmp, a message whose user name matched no configured user was rejected only if the name was non-empty or the message claimed authentication. An empty name with no authentication fell through to a branch that created a synthetic user, and the request was then served as if it were authorised. The application could not tell, because its callback is not given the requesting user.

Affected (per the advisory): net-snmp 2.1.0 to 3.29.2, for applications that run an Agent, Receiver or proxy Forwarder reachable by untrusted hosts with authorization left on (the default). With the default access-control setting, an agent was readable and writable whether it was configured with SNMPv3 users, community strings, or both. With the stricter "Simple" access control, direct empty-name reads and writes were refused (GETNEXT still revealed the next object's name), but on agents with proxy entries, empty-name requests sent to a proxy context were forwarded and could read and write the proxied device.

How it was shown

Against version 3.29.2 on a local test machine: an agent configured with a single password-protected user (authPriv) rejected an unknown user name and the real user without a password, but a single 76-byte GET packet with an empty user name read its secret value; further one-packet requests overwrote it (SET) and returned the next object (GETNEXT), which is how a whole agent's data can be walked. The same worked against an agent configured only with a community string, and a receiver configured for one user accepted a forged alert from the empty name. With the suggested fix applied, every empty-name request was rejected, while the real user, engine discovery and the explicit "authorization disabled" mode still worked.

Response

The maintainer, Mark Abrahams, reproduced the report on 3.29.2 within about 17 hours, opened a private advisory, requested a CVE, and wrote a fix following the suggested approach. At his request the fix branch was tested before release: every case in the report was rejected; normal authenticated use (including engine discovery), forwarding for a real user and the "authorization disabled" mode still worked; and the project's own test suite passed (its 11 new tests fail on 3.29.2 and pass on the fix). While checking the proxy part of the report, he also found that the proxy path ignored the Simple access control for authenticated users as well, and fixed that in the same release as a separate advisory (GHSA-jjpx-x4gm-m546, High; the maintainer's own finding). Version 3.29.3 and both advisories were published on 18 November 2026. CVEs had been requested and not yet assigned as of 19 Nov 2026.

Cite as

Nobuo Otoi (ba-cybersecurity.com). net-snmp (npm): an SNMPv3 request with an empty user name bypassed authorization in the Agent and Receiver (report and fix). 2026. https://ba-cybersecurity.com/research/net-snmp-empty-user/.

@misc{otoi2026netsnmp,
  author       = {Otoi, Nobuo},
  title        = {net-snmp (npm): an SNMPv3 request with an empty user name bypassed authorization in the Agent and Receiver (report and fix)},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://ba-cybersecurity.com/research/net-snmp-empty-user/}},
  note         = {Advisory: GHSA-pg9p-672x-44jc - Fixed in net-snmp 3.29.3}
}

Reported 17 Nov 2026 - Fixed and released 18 Nov 2026 (3.29.3), UTC · This page: updated 19 Nov 2026 · Permanent address: https://ba-cybersecurity.com/research/net-snmp-empty-user/