Public, source-linked measurement of disclosed breaches, exploited vulnerabilities and the state of public web defenses — Japan and worldwide, updated daily.
Problems found in Internet standards drafts, widely used software and cryptographic records, each shown with a counterexample or a machine-checked proof, and what happened next. All results →
Table 4 of CLAASPing ARADI prints 84 as the optimal six-round differential weight of the NSA cipher ARADI; inside CLAASP's own model the optimum is 82, with DRAT proofs re-verified by an independent checker that nothing lighter exists. The same method confirms the eight-round values 122 and 62 and shows that the nine-round linear value 71 is optimal. Not an attack.
The draft clause "private scalar less than 256" misses two key families that the same search recovers at the same cost. Shown on the eight real eMudhra keys and proved in Lean 4; a one-sentence correction is proposed on the ballot.
The ASPA verification procedure is proved correct in Lean 4 for paths of any length. The proposed ASRA extension can mark a correct route Invalid; a four-AS counterexample and a fix are given. An author replied on the list that the algorithm will be revised.
FreeRADIUS: TEAP could accept a client without verifying any MAC. Langfuse: any organisation member could invite users without the required role, by naming a project from another organisation. Both reported, both fixed, both credited.
Daily cybersecurity news for corporate security teams, compiled every morning by an AI editor from public reporting, with a link to every source. English and Japanese.
Six update daily, one monthly. Each card shows the headline figure of its radar, computed from the same published data; the radar page has the tables, the sources and the method.
Cyber incidents disclosed by organisations in Japan: route of entry, whether it was exploited from outside, linked to the organisation's own notice where one exists.
Every figure comes from public disclosures, regulatory filings, vendor changelogs or public datasets. Nothing is collected from clients or private systems.
Every item links to its source
Each incident links to the organisation's own notice where one exists, otherwise to the report it was taken from.
AI-assisted; machine-checked, not reviewed item by item
Extraction is AI-assisted. Before publishing, every page passes an automated check of its shape, sources and forbidden content; a page that fails is not published and the previous edition stays. Items are not reviewed one by one — read the source.
Archived and correctable
Daily snapshots of every radar's data are kept on GitHub (CC BY 4.0), corrections included.
A research activity, not an institution: not a government agency, CERT or vendor.
Run by
ba-cybersecurity.com is the name under which Nobuo Otoi, a cybersecurity researcher in Tokyo, publishes research. The main line studies the defense of web applications: how web application firewalls produce false positives, and how to predict the effect of a configuration change before it is deployed.
A second line is measurement — of email authentication, of routing and TLS posture, and of disclosed incidents. The radars above are the automated, public part of that measurement line.
Other topics in preparation: security of LLM use in business, and cyber risk assessment methods. An open-source tool for predicting the impact of OWASP CRS configuration changes, with a pre-registered prospective validation, is in preparation.